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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research was to investigate the leverage-performance relation with moderating firm size in 
developing countries like Pakistan. Data were collected from 304 Pakistani non-financial firms for the period 
of 2005-2013. It is found that overall leverage-performance relation is negative for all types of firms. However, 
such losses are more prominent for small size firms. Results also show that the leverage-performance relation 
is nonlinear for medium and large size firms. However, these firms are not targeting optimal level and over-
leveraging that ultimately decrease their profits. So, financial managers of small size firms should avoid debt 
financing while for large and medium size firms, managers need to adjust their debt ratio to its optimal level.
Keywords: firm size, leverage, performance, emerging market
INTRODUCTION
Capital structure is one of most studied areas 
of corporate finance from last few decades (Gama & 
Galvão, 2012; Stretcher & Johnson, 2011). Despite 
the abundant literature of capital structure, researchers 
are failed to consent to a single generalized theory. 
Although Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposed 
irrelevancy theory and argued that firm value was 
not affected by capital structure decisions, the theory 
was only applicable to perfect market conditions 
which were not subsisted in the real world. Myers 
(1984) also argued that in the absence of perfect 
market conditions, the capital structure became more 
relevant. Consequently, following irrelevancy theory, 
various theories are devised to explain the leverage-
performance relation in real world practices.
However, some researchers document different 
results and explain various rationales in this respect. 
Some find positive leverage-performance relation 
while others believe conversely and describe debt 
as negative connotation (Abor, 2010). Even some 
researchers find insignificant or inconsistent results 
in this respect (Fama & French, 1998; Lemmon & 
Zender, 2001). The reason behind such contradictory 
and inconsistent results is contingency and situational 
factors (Jermias, 2008). O’Brien (2003) also suggested 
that studying direct leverage-performance relationship 
could portray misleading conclusions due to situational 
and contingency factors. The magnitude and even 
direction of leverage-performance relation can change 
due to these factors. Therefore, it is important to 
consider moderating factors while studying leverage-
performance relation.
Previously, most of the researches explore 
direct leverage-performance relation while few 
articles consider moderating factors in this context. 
For instance, Jermias (2008) and O’Brien (2003) 
studied firm strategy and competitiveness, Simerly 
and Li (2000) explored environment dynamism, 
and McConnell and Servaes (1995) argued that the 
growth opportunities were as potential moderators to 
the leverage-performance relation. However, one of 
the firm specific less researched areas that can also 
moderate the leverage-performance relation is the firm 
size.
In 
Pr
es
s
100 Binus Business Review, Vol. 8 No. 2, August 2017, 99-106
Firm size is viewed as significant factor that 
can affect the firm’s relationship with its external 
environment (Ezeoha, 2008). Since larger firms 
have more capacity to influence their stakeholders, 
their role is more critical in corporate environment. 
Similarly, these firms play significant role in 
commercializing innovative ideas provided by small 
firms. From macroeconomic perspective, economic 
growth comes from the growth of large size concerns. 
Thus, with its increasing recognition to external 
business environment, firm size can be considered as 
important factor to internal corporate finance decisions 
(Voulgaris, Asteriou, & Agiomirgianakis, 2004).
If these arguments are true, capital structure 
decisions and their consequences can also be affected 
by firm size especially in developing countries 
where environment is more dynamic. The dynamic 
environment can variably affect the competitiveness of 
large and small firms that affect their capital structure 
decisions. The purpose of this research is also to 
investigate the leverage-performance relationship 
within contingency factor of firm size for Pakistani 
non-financial firms. In Pakistan, existing literature is 
vacant from study of leverage-performance relation in 
moderation of firm size. Hence, the first contribution 
of this research is contextual where underlying topic 
is investigated in case of developing countries like 
Pakistan for non-financial firms. However, some of the 
researches have explored firm size as moderator to the 
capital structure decisions in other countries (González 
& González, 2012; Ozenbas & Portes, 2011; Voulgaris 
et al., 2004). They explore how different factors affect 
financing decisions in small and large firms while 
no attention is given to the consequences of these 
financing decisions. Meanwhile, they do not search 
whether financing decisions due to moderating effect 
of size is profitable or not. For instance, if large or 
small firm has more or less debt then it becomes more 
important to know whether this financing decision 
will increase their firm value or not. This research is 
intended to answer this successive research question 
and focuses on the firm value when small, or large 
firms deploy more or fewer debt. Therefore, novelty 
of this research revolves around twofold objectives 
which are contextual contribution and consequences 
of financing decisions for small and large firms.
Originally, it was Modigliani and Miller (1958) 
who first started the debate of leverage-performance 
relation. They argued that under efficient market 
hypotheses such as neutral tax, no agency cost, 
symmetric information and no transaction cost, the firm 
value was irrelevant of its capital structure. However, 
the implication of irrelevancy theory is questioned due 
to the non-existence of efficient market in real world 
(Harris & Raviv, 1991). After that, various researchers 
have established the rationales for the implication 
of leverage-performance relation in the absence of 
efficient market. Trade-off theory, pecking order 
theory, and agency theory are three most prominent 
relevancy theories.
According to trade-off theory, benefits and 
costs are associated with debt and firms should follow 
a targeted debt ratio where benefits are maximum 
against minimum loss (Graham, 2000; Kim & 
Sorensen, 1986). The benefit of debt is tax advantages. 
Conversely, increased debt level augments the chance 
of default and the cost of financial distress. Such costs 
are segregated into two categories of direct cost of 
financial distress and indirect cost of financial distress. 
However, firms can maximize their value to follow 
optimal debt ratio where its benefits are maximum 
with minimum cost (Kim & Sorensen, 1986).
Similarly, agency theory articulates debt as 
positive connotation in term of controlling mechanism 
of agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Managers are the agent of their shareholders, and 
they should work in the best interest of their principal. 
However, conflict can arise between the objectives of 
managers and their shareholders especially regarding 
free cash flows (Jensen, 1986). It is argued that 
managers can use free cash flows for their personal 
benefits while deploying more debt can enforce them 
to invest such free cash flows to positive Net Present 
Value (NPV) projects to meet new-fangled obligations. 
Moreover, creditors also impose debt covenants that 
restrict managers to use these cash flows for their 
personal benefits. This implies that debt can act as 
monitoring mechanism and increase managerial 
performances.
Conversely, pecking order theory postulates 
negative leverage-performance relationship. The 
theory states that firms prefer the internal funds 
over debt and equity while financing the operations 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984). It suggests that firms follow 
hierarchy of financing options that start from retaining 
earnings to external debts to equity. Since asymmetric 
information prevails in the market, it believes that 
investors will underprice newly issued shares. To 
avoid such losses managers consider equity financing 
as a last resort. Thus, profitable firms prefer their 
internal funds to finance their operations that lead to 
negative leverage-performance relation.
However, according to Ezeoha (2008), these 
traditional capital structure theories do not endow 
with sufficient explanation of capital structure for 
small, medium or large firms. The implication of 
these theories can vary within these categories of firm 
size because small and large firms contain different 
characteristics which can direct to different financial 
decisions (Voulgaris et al., 2004). Subsequent part 
explores how these categories of firm size differ from 
each other and affect capital structure decisions.
Previous literature has explored various 
factors between large and small size firms. The most 
prominent distinguishing factors are level of profits 
and their volatility (González & González, 2012). 
Larger firms generate high and less volatile profits 
while small firms do conversely. Similarly, small 
firms also document low liquidity than large firms. 
This indicates that small firms can be riskier due to 
low liquidity and volatile profits compared to larger 
firms. Moreover, larger firms hold more fixed tangible 
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assets than the small firms. Such characteristics make 
it easier for larger firms to access debt markets without 
difficulty. Thus, it is much possible that large firms 
deploy more debts than small firms.
However, the important thing is what will be 
the value of large and small firms if they deploy more 
debt. The purpose of this research is to investigate the 
role of firm size in the leverage-performance relation. 
Moderating effects of firm size in leverage-performance 
relation is found to be ignored previously, although, 
people can find research investigating leverage-
performance relation for SMEs without comparing 
it with large firms. For instance, Abor (2010) studied 
leverage-performance relation for SMEs from Ghana 
and South Africa and found that in general debt and 
especially long term debts were negatively associated 
with firm profitability. On the contrary, Jaggi & Gul 
(1999) suggested there were moderating effects of size 
to the relationship between investment opportunities, 
free cash flow and debt. Their results revealed that 
there was a positive relationship between debt and free 
cash flows for low investment opportunity when firm 
size was high. They found that size was a significant 
moderator to the relation between investment 
opportunities, free cash flow and performance.
González and González (2012), and Voulgaris et 
al. (2004) examined determinants of capital structure 
to the contingency of firm size, but they did not 
consider it with leverage-performance relation. This 
research proposed that leverage-performance relation 
could vary within different firm size. Since large firms 
generated high and less volatile profits with strong 
liquidity, their risk was also lower comparatively.
Similarly, information is less asymmetric 
in large firms that also decrease their uncertainty 
level. Moreover, large firms hold high tangible 
assets that they can use as collateral for external 
debt. Consequently, these large firms access the debt 
market easily at lower cost to gain tax advantages. 
Thus, in accordance with the trade-off theory, one can 
anticipate positive leverage-performance relation for 
large size firms. Agency theory also describes such 
positive leverage-performance relationship for large 
firms. Since large firms generate more profits and hold 
high free cash flows, managers can use it for their 
benefits. To avoid such agency issue, debt can act 
as monitoring mechanism and enforce managers for 
better performances. Hence, the first hypothesis of this 
research is as follows.
H1: There is positive relation between debt ratio 
and firm profitability for larger firms.
On the contrary, small firms contain low liquidity 
and low profits with more volatility that increases 
its risk premium. Small firms show more exposure 
to market dynamism that increases its idiosyncratic 
risk, and ultimately excesses return comparatively. 
This argument can be more prominent in developing 
countries where the environment is more volatile. In 
Pakistan, high-risk premium that increases the cost of 
debt for small firms can also be predicted. Moreover, 
information is more asymmetric for small firms that 
make it difficult to access the debt market at lower cost. 
Thus, it is possible that small firms can not surpass 
tax benefits against the high cost of debt. Hence, the 
second hypothesis of this research is as follows.
H2: There is negative relation between debt ratio 
and firm profitability for small firms.
METHODS
To conclude the proposed theory, 304 
nonfinancial firms listed at KSE are selected for the 
period of 2005 to 2013. Selected panel data include 
2.557 observations and are collected from annual 
publications of balance sheet analysis of nonfinancial 
firms published by State Bank of Pakistan. However, 
this selection of the sample is made after excluding 
financial firms, default firms, firms which report 
negative equity, and firms’ observations which show 
zero sales. The financial sector is excluded because 
they have different characteristics especially its 
operations. Default firms are also excluded because 
these firms normally show continuous deteriorating 
performances due to financial distress. Their inclusion 
can affect the comparative analysis of debt financing 
on firm performances. The reason to exclude negative 
equity observations is due to accumulated losses 
more than share capital that can mislead the results. 
Moreover, with zero sales, no activity is performed 
and shows no value to their performances and should 
not be the part of analysis.
To assess the moderating effects of firm size on 
the leverage-performance relation, fixed effect model 
is used. Table 1 shows the detail of variables used in 
the proposed model. The dependent variable is Return 
on Assets (ROA) while independent variables include 
Debt Ratio (DR) and its cross effects with small and 
large firm size. Medium firm size is taken as the 
reference category, so its cross effect is not included. 
Firms are categorized as small, medium and large on 
the basis of natural log of their sales (ln (Sales)). Firms 
whose values lie within the first quartile of ln (Sales) 
are considered as small firms. Similarly, firms who lie 
in the fourth quartile are labeled as large firms while 
remaining second and third quartile are considered 
as medium size firm. This methodology is consistent 
with González and González (2012) who categorized 
firms on the basis of quartiles of ln (sales).
ROAit= α + β 1DRit + β 2DRit*Small+β 3DRit*Large + 
β 4STTAit  + β 5CRit + β 6RecTAit + Ut + Vi + εit”       (1)
Proposed model in Equation 1 also includes 
three control variables of Sales to Total Assets 
(STTA), Current Ratio (CR), and Receivables to Total 
Assets (RecTA). Ut and Vi represent the unobserved 
variations due to firm variants and time specific of 
dummy factors. STATA is used to execute proposed 
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models. To check the reliability of results, various 
diagnostics as proposed by Torres-Reyna (2007) 
are also conducted. It is notable that coefficient of 
DR (β1) represents the slope of debt ratio for the 
reference category of medium firms. However, for 
small and large firms, DR becomes (β1 + β2) and (β1 
+ β3) respectively. β2 and β3 show marginal effects of 
debt when a firm is small and large respectively as 
compared to medium firms. These marginal effects 
and their slopes explore whether debt financing is 
optimal decision for small, medium and large firms or 
not. Consequently, hypotheses of this research could 
also be testified.
Table 1 Definition of Variables
Variable Symbol Formula
Dependent 
Variable
ROA EBIT / Total Assets
Independent 
Variable
DR Total Liabilities / Total Assets
Moderating 
Variables
Small Equals to 1 if ln(Sales) lies in 
first quartile and 0 otherwise
Large Equals to 1 if ln(sales) lies in 
fourth quartile and 0 otherwise
Control 
Variables
STTA Total Sales / Total Assets
CR Current Assets / Current 
Liabilities
RecTA Total Receivables / Total 
Assets
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Descriptive statistics for the sampled data 
are presented in Table 2. Data is categorized on 
size firms which are small, medium, and large. The 
descriptive analysis shows that small firms earned 
low profitability of only 3,9% as the average ROA 
compared to 10,4% and 14,1% ROA of medium and 
large firms respectively. Moreover, Standard Deviation 
(SD) of ROA for small firms is also high variations 
of 14% even with lower average returns. Thus, it can 
be concluded that comparatively small firms contain 
fewer profits with more variation that is consistent 
with prior discussion. However, not much difference 
is found between average Debt Ratio (DR) of small 
and large firms, but it is with more variations for small 
firms.
Results also describe usage of high Short Term 
Debt Ratio (STDR), calculated as the ratio of current 
liabilities to total assets) regardless the type of firm. 
One of the reasons behind the over reliance on current 
liabilities can be attributed to the inefficiencies of 
capital markets in Pakistan. Capital markets especially 
bond markets are not developed in Pakistan that 
confines the financing options to short term instruments 
generally (Raza, Aslam, & Farooq, 2013). The results 
also reveal that small firms have documented better 
liquidity (1,560) as than medium firm (1,327) and 
even large firms (1,494). This can be because more 
investment in current assets used by small firms as a 
short term debt ratio for both the categories does not 
differ significantly. STTA for small firms also shows 
low statistics and indicates that more investment in 
working capital is not utilized optimally. Hence, it can 
be concluded that small firms contain low and volatile 
profits, better liquidity, and low asset efficiencies than 
large firms in Pakistani non-financial firms.
Table 3 provides the results of the proposed 
model. Because the data is panel, it is important to 
decide that whether fixed effect model has appropriate 
or random effect. The researchers conduct Hausman 
test to examine the null hypothesis that estimations 
of both fixed and random effect models are same. 
Significant value shows that there are substantial 
differences in the coefficients estimated by fixed and 
random effect models and one should select fixed 
effect model.
Table 3 also shows that Hausman test is 
significant and confirms that fixed effect is more 
appropriate compared to random effect model. The 
researchers also conduct diagnostics test for fixed 
model as explained by Torres-Reyna (2007). To check 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistic
ROA DR STDR STTA CR RecTA
Mean Small 0,039 0,555 0,409 1,073 1,560 0,096
Medium 0,104 0,593 0,423 1,253 1,327 0,095
Large 0,141 0,560 0,416 1,450 1,494 0,110
SD Small 0,140 0,237 0,215 1,928 1,867 0,123
Medium 0,097 0,191 0,168 0,688 1,062 0,094
Large 0,124 0,191 0,189 1,041 1,013 0,130
Max Small 1,772 0,996 0,959 21,062 14,600 1,183
Medium 0,604 1,046 0,956 4,525 9,579 0,565
Large 0,633 0,999 0,972 7,021 12,229 0,704
Min Small -1,213 0,006 0,000 0,000 0,077 0,000
Medium -0,553 0,063 0,000 0,118 0,169 0,000
Large -1,236 0,024 0,024 0,182 0,214 0,000
(Source: Authors’ calculation)
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whether time dummies are important to be included, 
testparm test is used. Results show that f-value of 
testparm test is significant and using time dummies to 
the proposed model is more appropriate.
Because Hausman test is significant, there is no 
need to conduct Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier 
for the random effect model. The other important 
assumption of fixed effect model is cross sectional 
dependence of residuals. However, the cross section 
dependence assumption is important for the macro 
panel (Torres-Reyna, 2007). Panel data used is micro 
data with less number of years and high numbers of 
entities. Therefore, cross sectional dependency is not 
critical. The researchers use Pesaran CD test although 
the results are not calculated due to few number of 
years across a high number of entities. Similarly, 
another assumption of serial correlation is not critical 
for micro data (Torres-Reyna, 2007).
The assumption of heteroskedasticity is 
checked by modifying Wald test in STATA. It is 
found that chi2 is highly significant and rejects the 
null hypothesis with constant variances. This shows 
that the heteroskedasticity prevails and can affect 
t-values of each variable. However, to control this, the 
researchers use robust fixed effect model as proposed 
by Torres-Reyna (2007). Similarly, significant Model 
of f-value (44,80) concludes that overall model is 
significant variations in the dependent variable. So, 
verification of assumptions and taking appropriate 
measures accordingly indicates that results obtained 
are reliable. Subsequent part interprets the results 
obtained from proposed model.
Table 3 Size and Leverage-Performance Relation
ROA β t-value Sig.
Intercept 0,127*** 3,990 0,000
DR -0,187*** -6,400 0,000
DR*Small -0,030** -2,250 0,025
DR*Large 0,036*** 2,590 0,010
STTA 0,062*** 5,510 0,000
RecTA 0,067* 1,800 0,072
CR 0,003 0,530 0,599
Time Dummy Yes Hausman 93,68***
Industry 
Dummies
Yes Testparm 
F-Value
4,22***
Adjusted R2 16,40% Modified 
Wald
1,0e+36***
Model F 21,54***
Significance: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%
(Source: Authors’ calculation)
Results reveal that all the variables except a 
control variable of CR provide significant results. It 
shows that for medium firms, a unit change in DR 
decreases its ROA by 18,7% or -0,187 on average. 
For small firms, these losses further decrease by 3% 
or -0,030. Consequently, DR in small firms becomes 
-0,217 (-0,187-0,030). Low and volatile earnings and 
more asymmetric information can be the main reason 
of this negative marginal effect. Ozenbas and Portes 
(2011) argued that cost of debt was high for small 
firms which credit was constrained due to asymmetric 
information. Voulgaris et al. (2004) also argued that 
asymmetric information made the lenders lend with 
high cost of debt or collateral.
Conversely, marginal effect of large firms is 
positive and shows the increase in DR also increase 
its profits by 3,6% compared to the medium firms. 
Then, DR for large firms is -0,151 (-0,187 + 0,036). 
The positive marginal effect can be from the 
better access to debt market with less asymmetric 
information. Thus, overall debt financing negatively 
affects the firms’ profits for all three types of firms 
while such losses are more prominent for small firms. 
This negative leverage-performance relation can be 
explained with pecking order theory that argues the 
preference of internal funds. Similarly, Zeitun and Tian 
(2007) provided another argument that in developing 
countries, companies were often overleveraged to 
solve its problems which ultimately decreased the 
performances.
No study till date can define the optimal level 
of capital structure. This increases the probability that 
firms do not get the optimal level to gain its maximum 
benefits with the minimal cost of debt and become 
overleveraged. This argument appears to be more 
relevant to agency problem persists in developing 
countries, especially for large firms containing high 
free cash flows. Moreover, the implication of the 
pecking order theory can also be negated because of 
positive marginal effects of large firms containing 
more internal funds. If the argument of overleverage 
is accepted, the leverage-performance relation will be 
nonlinear. Some level of DR and its benefits exceed 
its cost while the level cost of debt also surpasses its 
benefits. Table 4 provides the results of fixed effect 
model with squares of cross effects of DR of three 
types of firms as proposed in the following model. The 
quadratic nonlinear leverage-performance relation is 
expected for the small, medium and large firm, so its 
squares are used. The equation is as follows.
ROA = α + β 1DRit*Small + β2 (DR*Small)
2 + β 
3DR*Med + β 4(DR*Med)
2 + β 5DR*Large + β 
6(DR*Large)
2 + β 7STTAit + β8 CRit + β9 RecTAit + Ut+ 
Vi + ε it                                               (2)
Results reveal that all cross effects of DR 
are significant except for small firms. Insignificant 
DR*Small accepts the null hypothesis that its beta 
equals to zero. Conversely, square of cross effect 
(DR*Small)2 is significant and negative. Hence, the 
leverage-performance relation is linear and negative for 
small firms. It is consistent with the second hypothesis 
proposed in this research. Reasons behind this can 
be the volatile and low earnings with asymmetric 
information that make debt costly financing option 
for small firms as argued. Moreover, the implication 
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of pecking order theory can also be the reason of 
negative linear relation for small firms. Results from 
descriptive analysis indicate better liquidity position 
especially in term of current assets for small firms. It 
is much possible that small firms rely on its internal 
funds rather than external debt.
Nevertheless, the leverage-performance relation 
is found nonlinear for medium and large firms. It 
also shows that cross effects of DR for medium and 
large firms are positive while its squares are negative. 
These results are also significant. This proves that 
initially, the leverage-performance relation is positive 
for medium and large firms, and after a particular 
debt level, it becomes negative. Specifically, initially 
increase in DR, ROA of medium and large firms is 
increased by 0,174 and 0,220 respectively. However, 
after a particular DR increase, it decreases the ROA 
of medium and large firms by -0,314 and -0,332 
respectively. That particular debt level is the optimal 
DR where profits are maximized. Therefore, the first 
hypothesis is partially accepted as for large firms that 
the leverage-performance relation is positive in a 
particular debt level.
Table 4 Nonlinear Leverage-Performance and Size
ROA β t-value Sig.
Intercept 0,031 1,400 0,161
DR*Small 0,1 1,350 0,177
(DR*Small)2 -0,251*** -3,740 0,000
DR*Med 0,174** 2,530 0,011
(DR*Med) 2 -0,314*** -5,280 0,000
DR*Large 0,220*** 2,860 0,004
(DR*Large) 2 -0,332*** -4,430 0,000
STTA 0,059*** 14,880 0,000
RecTA 0,065** 2,360 0,019
CR 0,009*** 3,490 0,000
Time Dummy Yes Model F 39,14***
Industry Dummy Yes Hausman 688,8***
Adjusted R2 17,65%
Significance: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%
(Source: Authors’ calculation)
From the process of optimization, it can see 
the optimal DR. The process shows the step in 
the optimization process. Taking the derivative of 
proposed model regarding DR, the result is found.
ΔROA = β1 Small + 2 β2DR (Small) + β3 Med + 
2 β4 DR(Med)
2 + β5 Large + 2 β6 DR(Lar
ge)2                                                                                                           (3)ΔDR
Since in optimal level f’ (ROA) will be zero, the 
following equation is extracted for DR where ROA is 
at its optimal value.
DR =
-β1 Small-β3 Med-β5 Large
2 β2 (Small)
2+2 β4 (Med)
2+2 β6 (Large)
2   (4)
By using table 4, optimal level for small firms is as 
follows.
DR =
-β1 =
0
= 0 →
2 β2 -0,251
Relation is linear and no optimal level                 (5)
For medium size optimal level will be as follows.
DR =
-β3 =
- 0,174
= 0,2771 or 27,71%
2 β4 2 (-0,314)
        (6)
For large firms, optimal level will be
DR =
-β5 =
- 0,220
= 0,3313 or 33,13%
2 β6 2 (-0,332)
        (7)
Thus, for medium firms, its ROA will increase 
in line with the increase in DR till its value reaches 
to 0,2771, while after this, the level of DR profits 
starts to decrease. This implies that Pakistani medium 
non-financial firms should target 0,2771 of DR on 
average to maximize its value. However, in practice, 
the average DR for medium firms is 0,593 as found 
in Table 2 of descriptive statistics. Similarly, for large 
firms, the desired DR is 0,3313 while in practice its 
average DR is 0,560 as found in Table 2. Thus, in 
general, large firms are also far away from its optimal 
level. This indicates that on average medium and large 
firms are over-leveraged that could be the reason of 
overall negative relation found in Table 3.
These results also reveal an important implication 
of trade-off theory. Results show that optimal DR for 
the medium firm is 27,71% while for large firms is 
33,31%. This proves that optimal level of DR changes 
for different types of firms. Therefore, modified trade-
off theory proposed states that targeted optimal level 
under trade-off theory is not a general value, but it can 
depend on firm’s specific moderators such as firm size. 
There are four important implications based on that. 
First, the leverage-performance relation is negative 
and linear for small firms. Second, the leverage-
performance relation is nonlinear for medium and large 
firms. Third, in practice medium and large firms do not 
follow optimal level and over-leveraging that decrease 
its profits. Last, optimal DR is not a generalized value 
and depends on firm’s specific moderations.
CONCLUSIONS
The research explores the comparative leverage-
performance relation in Pakistani small, medium, 
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and large non-financial firms. It postulates that debt 
financing by large firms increase its profits while same 
financing decision by small firms does conversely. 
Regression analysis accepts both of the proposed 
hypotheses. Results show that debt by small firms 
affects its profits severely while for large size firms 
this adverse effect is found the minimum. It is argued 
that small firms contain more asymmetric information 
with low and volatile returns that make debt more 
costly. Conversely, large firms have better access to 
debt market with less asymmetric information so it 
deploys debt with less cost comparatively. Results also 
state that marginal effect of large firms is positive but 
overall DR still shows negative results. It is suggested 
that firms overleveraged in pursuit of the optimal level 
that decreases the overall profits.
Moreover, the leverage-performance relation 
is also found nonlinear for medium and large firms. 
Meanwhile, for small firms, it is linear and negative. 
Therefore, debt financing always affects the value of 
small size firms negatively. However, for medium and 
large firms, it affects a certain level while positively. 
After that, the profits start to decrease. Results 
describe that debt financing increases medium firms’ 
profits till the DR reaches 0,2771. Then, these profits 
start to decrease. Similar results are found in large 
firms with the optimal level of 0,3313. However, 
descriptive statistics show that in real practice medium 
and large firms have the average debt ratio of 0,59 and 
0,56 respectively. Thus, both large and medium firms 
should not target optimal level and be over-leveraged 
itself.
The outcome of this research has strong practical 
implications as it will help financial managers in 
choosing appropriate financing decisions for different 
types of firms in developing countries like Pakistan. 
It is recommended that financial managers of small 
firms should avoid debt. However, in medium and 
large firms, optimal targeted DR should be followed to 
avoid the overleveraging problem.
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